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Abstract: This paper aims to offer a broad criticism of the underpinnings of 
the so-called “complexity-theories” in their approach to a problem that has 
puzzled philosophers and scientists for centuries: the relationship between 
mind and body. We will pay special attention to the ideas of Alicia Juarrero, 
a distinguished exponent of this explanatory model, whose epistemological 
implications will be outlined in regard to her diffuse understanding of causality. 
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Resumen: El artículo plantea una crítica general de los fundamentos subyacentes 
a las denominadas “teorías de la complejidad”, al menos en su tratamiento de un 
problema que ha desconcertado a filósofos y científicos a lo largo de los siglos: la 
relación entre la mente y el cuerpo. Presta especial atención a las ideas de Alicia 
Juarrero, exponente distinguida de este modelo explicativo, con el objetivo de 
discutir las implicaciones epistemológicas de su proyecto, sobre todo de su difusa 
comprensión de la causalidad.
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Adherents to the so-called “complexity-theories” tend to sharply criti-
cize the traditional conception of causality (which they attribute to Hume and 
Newton), caricatured in the image of the “billiard-ball,” because “it has failed 
as a general theory”2. It is interesting to notice that they do not advocate a re-
finement of the traditional idea of cause in Newtonian physics through the less 
deterministic approach that can be found in quantum mechanics: they argue 
that the traditional view is utterly incorrect both in its fundamentals and sco-
pe; therefore, it needs to be abandoned. They claim that there is a “new scien-
tific framework,” based upon the study of complex dynamic systems, which 
offers a persuasive, alternative view on causality that may solve the difficulties 
associated to its traditional understanding by modern philosophy. 
However, what does this “new scientific framework” consist of? Appa-
rently, this conceptual revolution should be inspired by a parallel scientific 
change of paradigm, which would gravitate around notions like “emergence,” 
“positive feedback,” and complexity. For example, Juarrero claims that “com-
plex adaptive systems are typically characterized by positive feedback proces-
ses in which the product of the process is necessary for the process itself”3, 
some sort of Spinozan causa sui which, in her view, stands in radical contrast 
with Aristotle’s philosophy. Global dynamics apparently regulate and “cons-
train” the lower-level parts. 
How does she support these somewhat speculative claims? Moreover, 
what new understanding of “causality” do her claims generate? Only intuition, 
and discomfort with the standard mechanistic model that can be found in most 
branches of the natural sciences, lies at the heart of her proposal. 
First of all, even if it were true that new properties emerge and exert 
a “feedback” influence on its constituent parts, would it actually revolutionize 
our idea of causality? In no ways it would. The cause would still be there. Such 
a feedback mechanism would simply refer to the fact that the over-all disposi-
tion of the parts may be significant for their present and future states, but it 
does not alter their “past” constitution: linearity is not lost. Juarrero cannot 
show how this could occur. 
After all, there is no “mystery” in understanding the possibility that who-
les as such may have influence on their parts: this can be fully explained by or-
dinary science. Since Juarrero is not appealing to quantum principles or to more 
obscure aspects of subatomic physics, like the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox, 
one may wonder from which theoretical discipline she can draw her evocative 
conclusions.  Perhaps her conclusions are based on the study of non-equilibrium 
dynamic systems. But it is necessary to bear in mind that non-equilibrium dyna-
[2] Juarrero, A., 2000, “Dynamics in action: intentional behavior as a complex system”, Emergence 
2/2 25.
[3] Op. cit., 26.
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mics does not violate the traditional understanding of causality (unless it should 
occur in the elusive realm of quantum physics). Rather, it simply recognizes the 
capacity of certain complex systems to produce ordered structure when they act 
outside of equilibrium4. Trying to caricature the traditional scientific idea of cau-
se as a mere set of “collisions” is entirely misleading. Modern science, except in 
some mechanistic conceptions, did not reduce everything to a collision-paradigm: 
causality alludes to the evidence that any given state stems from a previous sta-
te5. “Cause” is actually a philosophical rather than a scientific conception. The 
fathers of modern science spoke in terms of forces and energies rather than cau-
ses; the idea of “cause” corresponds to a more epistemological understanding of 
the operative principles of modern science. 
It is possible that some adherents to complex system theories may be 
confusing causality and determinism. However, even in a non-deterministic 
universe, causes would still be necessary to relate different states to each 
other. And even if some sort of “backwards causation” (or “top-down causa-
tion,” which is equally striking) were possible, we would still have causation. 
But causation involves relating two states in terms of an antecedent state and 
a subsequent one. There is no way of avoiding this structure if one wants to 
understand the physical universe. In an intentional world, we still find causes, 
even if they should be understood “intentionally:” someone has to “cause” voli-
tions, thoughts, and feelings. 
According to Juarrero6, in complex systems, unlike classical thermod-
ynamics, time matters. This consideration can be found in Ilya Prigogine’s 
work7. I have no objection at all: it is clear that in biological systems “his-
tory,” so to speak, is essential for the understanding of how things have evol-
ved. But what does this have to do with causation? Are these historical “criti-
cal points” uncaused? We cannot escape the dilemma posed by causality and 
intentionality by simply appealing to an idea of “self-organization,” which is 
still causal in nature. 
[4] For an introduction to the science of non-equlibrium systems, see the classic work by Prigogine, 
I., 1968, Introduction à la Thermodynamique des Processus Irréversibles. Paris: Dunod. For a more 
updated account, see Mauri, R.,  2013, Non-Equilibrium Thermodynamics in Multiple Flows. Dor-
drecht: Springer.
[5] We shall not delve into the vast discussion on the interpretation of the idea of cause. M. Kis-
tler, 2006 (Causation and Laws of Nature. Routledge: London), offers a thorough depiction of the 
principal models. Broadly speaking, we support an understanding of causation which interprets it 
as a set of relations between events in space and time. It is susceptible to an ultimately scientific 
translation in terms of physical and chemical quantities (energy, momentum…).
[6] For a more detailed account of her view, see Juarrero, A., 2002, Dynamics in Action. MIT Press: 
Cambridge MA. A more recent defense of her approach can be found in Juarrero, A. – Rubino, C.A. 
(eds.), 2008, Emergence, Complexity, and Self-Organization: Precursors and Prototypes. Goddyear: 
ISCE Pub.
[7] See Prigogine, I., 1979, La Nouvelle Alliance: Métamorphose de la Science. Paris: Gallimard.
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For Juarrero, a new ‘type’ of entity appears, one that is functionally 
differentiated. The newly organized hierarchy constrains its components’ be-
havior top down by restructuring them “in previously unrelated ways”8. But 
where is the problem? What challenge does it pose to the traditional scientific 
conception? Is Juarrero appealing to simultaneity or to the birth of entities 
“out of nothing”? An “entity” constitutes a conceptually artificial division, but 
still no entity “is created out of nothing,” and nothing appears without a pre-
vious constraint. A truly self-cause would imply an ex-nihilo birth of a cause: 
this could only be accepted, in extremis, in the conceptual realm. 
Is there a mystery regarding the interaction between the whole and 
its components? Does any scientific problem arise from admitting that the 
whole equals the sum of its parts plus its interactions, so that these mutual 
interactions have an effect on the component parts?  In my view, no real pro-
blem emerges. Also, there is nothing enigmatic about auto-catalytic process, 
“self-caused” processes like self-division. There is no “self-cause” operating in 
those processes. Biology has progressed without the necessity of any explana-
tion based on “self-causation.” It is clear that those self-replicating processes 
have a “cause” which impels a certain behavior, even if it is originated by the 
living being itself instead of a chain of stimuli. 
In summary, self-organization9 does not violate causality. If by self-or-
ganization we understand the capacity of certain systems to dispose of their 
own energy, I cannot see in which sense a violation of the traditional idea of 
causality occurs. The cause is interior, and it may be related with the quest of 
the state of highest energetic equilibrium. The emergence of new features and 
properties poses no mystery at all, for the fundamental principles of conser-
vation of energy are not violated. Therefore, there is no escape from the “cau-
sal” viewpoint. Otherwise, the process must be interpreted to be uncaused, an 
unacceptable hypothesis. Also, self-causality is a contradiction in terms10. No 
self-cause arises in the universe, with the possible exception of intentions and 
the “first” hypothetical cause in the beginning of the cosmos, back to Big Bang. 
Against the potential objection that our criticism shows proclivity to 
“reification”, we may also understand that properties are contemplated as 
[8] Juarrero, A., 2000, “Dynamics in action: intentional behavior as a complex system”, Emergence 
2/2, 31.
[9] For an overview of the concept of self-organization and its role in the study of brain dynamics, 
see Cosmelli, D. – Lachaux, J.P. –Thompson, E., 2007, “Neurodynamical approaches to conscious-
ness,” in Zellazo, P.D. – Moscovitch, M. – Thomspn, E. (eds.), Cambridge Handbook on Conscious-
ness. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 736-738.
[10] The only dimension in which it can be accepted is the sphere of intentions. However, rather 
than in terms of self-cause, we should speak of a new “first cause,” as if the universe started again 
from zero; at least, and taking into account the level of understanding achieved by our current neu-
robiological knowledge, we must still adhere to a provisional division between causes and inten-
tions, until science does not offer a convincing explanation of intentions as neurobiological causes. 
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“functions,” which can be explained in terms of the underlying structure. It 
is true that the theory of complex dynamic systems aims to deal with an una-
voidable fact: the increasing complexity that takes place in certain levels of 
reality. It evidences that reality is hierarchically organized into levels, some of 
which exhibit greater complexity than others, so that new properties emerge. 
But it is also a fact that their emergence can be explained scientifically. Again, 
the greatest change comes after the birth of consciousness, and, in any case, 
the use of categories like “complexity” and “self-organization” should be taken 
as merely descriptive, “metaphorical” tools, not as explanatory instruments. 
The fact that biological systems possess a higher degree of “control” 
over their internal processes, a certain endogenous “emancipation” from the 
environment (in such a way as to develop that which Jakob von Uexküll ca-
lled “Innenwelt”)11, does not contradict the laws of causality. Higher comple-
xity involves enjoying a larger number of possibilities, of “itineraries” which 
can be followed “equipotentially,” without violating fundamental causal prin-
ciples. However, this “multiple realizability” does not break causal ties. Also, 
we should notice that the number of “realizations” is never infinite: therefore, 
an “absolute” freedom does not appear at all. Irreversibility, as important as it 
may be far from equilibrium, does not violate causality, nor does the existence 
of “critical points” which radically reshape the evolution of a certain system.
Again, “abrupt appearance” (as in the case of Bernard cells and B-Z 
chemical waves, two classical examples used in discussions concerning com-
plexity and the emergence of order) does not imply self-causation, at least in 
the way in which Juarrero seems to understand this transcendental category. 
The impossibility of “predicting” an event does not mean that it has emerged 
uncaused.  Also, the dependence on the context does not mean lack of causality. 
Clearly, the more complex a system is, the more sensitive it can be to constra-
ints and influences arising from the surrounding environment. But “causali-
ty,” the exchange of energy to generate the new state, is not broken. Natural 
history may require a more sophisticated understanding than in the case of 
standard thermodynamic systems (in which reversibility is the key note). It 
may even demand a novel philosophical approach. However, it does not imply 
that we should accept a “rupture” of causality or a violation of conservation 
principles. The “freedom” for self-organization or “autopoeisis” of certain biolo-
gical systems is always limited: they enjoy “degrees of freedom,” never absolute 
freedom. Only in a situation of real “absolute freedom,” a freedom emerging ex 
nihilo, utterly unlinked to any previous state, this rupture could be accepted. 
As we have highlighted, only in the case of consciousness can we find this 
potential situation. In any other example, the scientific view of the world, the 
explanation of the structure and functioning of the universe in terms of the 
[11] See Von Uexküll, J., 1909, Umwelt und Innenwelt der Tiere. Springer: Berlin.
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relationships such as causes or interactions between its components, is not 
changed at all. 
Constraints and conditional probability do not alter the scientific image 
of the world. Perhaps due to a failure in certain expositions of evolutionary 
theory, which depicted living beings as mere automata reacting to stimuli and 
suffering random genetic mutations then selected by nature, some authors, 
like Stuart Kauffman, have insisted on the “self-organizing” capacities of living 
beings12. But this self-organization does not break with the scientific vision of 
the world. It refines it. Juarrero seems to be appealing to a more transcendent 
“rupture” which cannot be accepted in any realm -with the possible exception 
of the human mind-. 
Conclusions
Top-down causation does not solve any problem but complicates it. It 
introduces a mysterious power which acts “top-down,” while this process can 
be fully explained through traditional causation: there is no “rupture” of linea-
rity, for the final result always stands as the effect of a previous cause. 
I am sure that proponents of emergentism and the theory of complex 
systems (as applied to the mind-body problem) are inspired by the noble aim 
of linking causes and intentions in a broader scientific picture. They protest 
against scientific reductionism and they look for an integration of both matter 
and mind. However, from taking refuge in vague conceptions with no clear 
scientific utility nothing can be gained at all. Science has advanced by virtue of 
a rigorous understanding of the causal relations that bind the different states 
of nature. No vaporous notion has been admitted: no superfluous concept re-
mains in a truly scientific worldview. Ockham’s entia non sunt multiplicanda 
praeter necessitatem is as valid today as it was in the 14th century.  
The only realm in which a notion nowadays “elusive” to ordinary scien-
tific analysis can be admitted is the universe of mind. We do not know if mind 
will always remain beyond such analysis. What we do understand is that there 
is no need to use radical concepts with low explanatory potential in the sphere 
of matter, where standard scientific methodology fits quite well. 
[12] Kauffman offers a compelling exposition of his approach in Kauffman, S., 2000, Investigations. 
Oxford University Press: Oxford.
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